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Abstract 
In The Imperative of Responsibility, published in German in 1979 and in English five years 
later, Hans Jonas introduced a new moral imperative for the technological age that runs as 
follows: «Act so that the effects of your action are compatible with the permanence of 
genuine human life» (1984, p. 11). This article has two objectives: firstly to clarify what it 
means to live, in Jonas’ sense, a genuine human life, and secondly whether we can still live 
such a life if we radically enhance ourselves the way transhumanists tell us we should. We 
use two concepts from Jonas’ thought to flesh out the notion of genuine humanity – the 
human condition and the idea of Man – and argue that human enhancement could indeed 
compromise both: a prospect to be avoided. 
 
INTRODUCTION: TRANSHUMANISM AND THE ALLEGED THREAT OF 
DEHUMANISATION 
When Hans Jonas died in 1993 transhumanism was still a fringe ideology, promoted only by 
a few prominent technology enthusiasts who were regarded as visionaries by some, and as 
cranks by most. Today transhumanism has long since joined the cultural mainstream. It may 
not be, as Francis Fukuyama famously suggested, «the world’s most dangerous idea» (2009), 
but it has certainly become a highly influential one. The core belief of transhumanism – that 
we should develop and use technologies that allow us to overcome the human condition, and 
thereby become something other and, more importantly, better than human – is now fiercely 
defended by a growing number of academic supporters, and has, moreover, very much 
become the background assumption of many scientific and technological endeavours.  
At face value we may well ask: why not? Improvement is almost by definition good 
and desirable, and few would want to deny that the present state of humanity leaves much to 
be desired. Exploring possibilities to make us better as a species seems entirely reasonable, 
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and to oppose such exploration – or simply doubt its wisdom – almost an affront to reason 
itself. 
Its very reasonableness, however, or the appearance thereof, may in fact make 
transhumanism even more dangerous because it tends to conceal, and make difficult to 
articulate, precisely what is justly concerning about the whole human enhancement project. If 
there is a danger here it is all but invisible to a utilitarian, progressivist mindset – the very 
worldview that so dominates Anglophone bioethics. And a danger there is. 
«Transhumanism’s advocates», writes Fukuyama, «think they understand what constitutes a 
good human being, and they are happy to leave behind the limited, mortal, natural beings 
they see around them in favor of something better» (ibid.). What those who think in this way 
get wrong, according to Fukuyama, is not so much that they have false ideas about what is 
good and what is bad, but rather that they fail to see how the good and the bad are 
interlinked, how together they form a whole which constitutes our identity as human beings:  
Our good characteristics are intimately connected to our bad ones: if we weren’t 
violent and aggressive, we wouldn’t be able to defend ourselves; if we didn’t have 
feelings of exclusivity, we wouldn’t be loyal to those close to us; if we never felt 
jealousy, we would also never feel love. Even our mortality plays a critical function in 
allowing our species as a whole to survive and adapt. (Ibid.) 
We may not be perfect, but if in order to hold on to the things that we treasure in the human 
condition we have to put up with all the seemingly harmful bits as well, then instead of trying 
to rebuild ourselves in the image of the posthuman, it would make more sense to show 
«humility and respect» (ibid.) for the integrity of our existing human nature, abandoning the 
radical human enhancement project and with it the whole transhumanist agenda. 
Fukuyama evidently believes that not only is there something precious about being 
human (which a transhumanist may well agree with), but also that being human entails 
having all the apparent flaws that transhumanists would like us to be rid of. By radically 
enhancing ourselves we would run the risk of losing our humanity, and with it something that 
is too important, too valuable to sacrifice on the altar of technological progress. It is, 
however, not immediately clear what that something is. For that reason Fukuyama calls it 
«Factor X» (2002, p. 149), which he defines as that which remains when we strip a person of 
all their accidental and contingent characteristics (like skin colour, looks, gender, etc.), all of 
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which are irrelevant for our humanity. What remains is «some essential human quality […] 
that is worthy of a certain minimal level of respect» (ibid.).  
This idea clearly draws on Kant’s conceptualisation of dignity, which he defined as an 
inner and absolute value, meaning that whoever possesses it is not more or less valuable than 
other things, but infinitely valuable. Kant, however, thought that human dignity was rooted in 
a particular human ability, namely our autonomy: the ability to act purely out of respect for 
the moral law, or, in other words, our ability to do the right thing for no other reason than that 
it is the right thing. Fukuyama, in contrast, emphasises the holistic nature of human dignity, 
meaning that there is not one particular property that we owe our dignity to, but rather that 
the specific interplay of various different human properties makes us what we are. 
Accordingly «Factor X cannot be reduced to the possession of moral choice, or reason, or 
language, or sociability, or sentience, or emotions, or consciousness, or any other quality that 
has been put forth as a ground for human dignity. It is all of these qualities coming together 
in a human whole that make up Factor X» (p. 171). 
Fukuyama’s concerns are shared by other critics and sceptics of human enhancement. 
Because they would prefer to leave the fundamental character of humanity intact, this 
otherwise heterogeneous group of thinkers are rather disparagingly lumped together as 
‘bioconservatives’. Perhaps the most prominent such figure is Leon Kass, who explicitly 
warns of the «intrinsic threat of dehumanization» that the «promise of superhumanization» 
carries with it (2003, p. 10). But Kass, too, struggles to articulate precisely what it is that is 
supposedly at risk here. Our worries about superhumanisation, he says, «may have something 
to do« with what is «natural» or «humanly dignified» or with «the attitude that is properly 
respectful of what is naturally and dignifiedly human» (p. 17). And like Fukuyama, he 
suggests that there is «something inherently good or dignified» about the way we are 
constituted now, and accordingly pleads for a «richer bioethics» that, before anything else, 
tries to «clarify the human good and aspects of our given humanity that are rightly dear to us, 
and that biotechnology may serve or threaten» (20). Evidently Kass does not defend an 
uncritical acceptance, let alone endorsement, of all aspects of our being. On the contrary, he 
allows for the theoretical possibility that there are aspects of our given humanity that are 
wrongly dear to us, as well as the possibility of a biotechnology that serves those aspects of 
our given humanity that are rightly dear to us. Ultimately, however, Kass is in agreement 
with Fukuyama about the need to protect our given being from interventions that would make 
us, in some normatively relevant way, less human. 
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In their orientation toward bioethics in general and biotechnology in particular, 
Fukuyama and Kass are both indebted to Hans Jonas, who insisted that whatever we do with 
biotechnology, and whatever changes we bring about, these must, in order to be ethically 
permissible, be «compatible with the permanence of genuine human life» (1984, p. 11).
1
 One 
is immediately struck by the invocation of genuine human life, a formulation it is hard to 
imagine many contemporary ethicists invoking. What does Jonas mean by it? The term 
implies that there are forms of human life that are not genuine, that are perhaps somehow 
fake in that they only pretend or appear to be forms of human life. There may, in other words, 
be forms of human life that, in one way or another, look human without actually being 
human. This has a certain intuitive plausibility, but in order for it to be true we need to 
distinguish between aspects of our humanity that are essential to our being human and those 
that are merely contingent.  
Clearly, not everything about us is essential to our humanity. Our particular body 
shape, for example, our size range, and even our exact biological organisation surely have no 
bearing on it: a being like us except ten feet tall and quadrupedal would surely still count as 
human in the sense at play here. Equally, it seems implausible to suggest that there is nothing 
essential in our constitution – only a genealogical lineage, so that whatever the beings that we 
might develop into are like they will be human simply because they are our descendants. The 
problem with the latter claim is that we could just as well suggest that we are still whatever 
we were when we were not yet humans, all the way back to the first protozoa, which would 
make little sense since it would effectively deny the reality of qualitative changes.  
How do we then know what makes us what we are, as humans, and what – although it 
is in fact part of what we (currently) are – does not define us in our humanity? And even if 
we can identify some essential aspects of our being – aspects that make us human, so that any 
being lacking them (a protozoon for instance, but also, say, anyone who is biologically 
immortal) is not genuinely human – why would we be morally obligated to preserve them? 
                                                             
1
 Although Fukuyama does not mention Jonas in any of his single-authored works, he co-
authored Beyond Therapy, the President’s Council on Bioethics’ report on biotechnology and 
human enhancement, which does cite Jonas (2003, p. 311). In Kass’ case, by contrast, this 
debt is explicitly acknowledged (1995); indeed, he even co-dedicated Life, Liberty and the 
Defense of Dignity to Jonas for his «moral passion and philosophical courage» (2002, p. 
299). For a comparative account of Kass and Jonas’ ethical thought see Vogel (2008). 
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Evidently the notion of a genuine human life raises plenty of problems – hence, to some, the 
very suggestion that there is a categorical imperative to preserve it appears almost quaint, the 
sentiment of a bygone age. But perhaps this response is simply an expression of the biases of 
our own time. Perhaps, in our eagerness to affirm that there is nothing but historical and 
biological becoming, we overlook what Jonas called «the essential in transience itself» (p. 
125). It might just be the case, as Fukuyama supposed, that there is something definitive and 
of absolute worth in human life as it is now – something that is imperilled by certain 
technological developments. The present essay uses Jonas’ thought as a guide to identifying 
this something, motivated by the concern that it could be swept away by the biotechnological 
tide.  
 
JONAS’ THEORY OF RESPONSIBILITY OUTLINED 
Jonas’ new categorical imperative, demanding that we safeguard the continuity of genuine 
human life, finds its justification in his theory of responsibility. We will therefore begin by 
looking in detail at the latter.  
Jonas’ first premise is that all previous moral systems and norms pertain to acts that 
are temporally and spatially proximate in their effects. For the interpersonal domain 
traditional ethics, thus understood, remains adequate, even if we are occasionally required to 
rethink how its principles are to be applied. The real problem is that modern technology has 
radically expanded the reach of our action, such that the Earth and the distant future are now 
subject to its effects, and «since ethics is concerned with action, it should follow that the 
changed nature of human action calls for a change in ethics as well» (p. 1). It is this ethical 
gap that Jonas’ imperative is intended to fill. The principal context in which it is developed is 
the ecological crisis, but Jonas’ ethic also pertains to biotechnology and the life sciences, as is 
clear from the reference in The Imperative of Responsibility to an envisioned «applied» (p. 
21) sequel dealing with such issues. Jonas’ subsequent volume, Technik, Medizin und Ethik 
(Technology, Medicine, and Ethics) explicitly fulfils that promise (1985, p. 9), and collects 
the majority of his essays on bioethical issues. We shall draw on both texts to see what his 
new categorical imperative can tell us about the desirability or otherwise of the main goal of 
transhumanism: the radical biotechnological enhancement of future human beings. 
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Jonas claims that a justification for his imperative «must deal both with the rational 
ground of obligation [...] and with the psychological ground of its moving the will» (1984, p. 
85). It must have, in other words, adequate cognitive and non-cognitive foundations in order 
to be both binding and compelling. Together these tell us what we should value in human life, 
so we shall look at them in turn. 
The rational argument for the imperative of responsibility broadly proceeds as 
follows. Jonas holds that «the intrusion of distant future and global scales into our everyday, 
mundane decisions is an ethical novum which technology has thrust on us; and the ethical 
category pre-eminently summoned by this novel fact is: responsibility» (1982, p. 893). Why 
responsibility? Because it is a correlate of free action, and so «the claims on responsibility 
grow proportionately with the deeds of power» (ibid.). The concept of responsibility 
accordingly forms the centrepiece of Jonas’ ethical response to modern technological 
developments. He is not preoccupied with the metaphysical question of whether we are 
responsible for our own actions (although he does argue for this); rather, Jonas is chiefly 
interested in which beings we are responsible for: it is a «substantive, goal-committed 
concept of responsibility» concerning «[t]he well-being, the interest, the fate of others, 
[which] has, by circumstance or agreement, come under my care» (1984, p. 93).  
Clearly, having power over other beings does not alone ground moral responsibility 
for them. Power only becomes a matter for ethics in those cases where a good-in-itself is 
vulnerable, grounding «the ought-to-do of the subject who […] is called to its care» (ibid.). 
Although Jonas argues persuasively that all life is such a good, vulnerable according to the 
limitations of organismic being, for the purposes of the present essay we shall largely restrict 
our discussion to human beings. The possessions of ends – both psychological and biological 
– which we know ourselves through immediate reflection to have, necessitates the existence 
of subjective value, as «with any de facto pursued end […] attainment of it becomes a good, 
and frustration of it, an evil; and with this distinction the attributability of value begins» (p. 
79). In other words, we can be benefitted or harmed through the satisfaction or otherwise of 
our ends. For some, this interest will be sufficient evidence that humanity is worthy of moral 
consideration. Jonas goes further, however, and attempts to demonstrate that the existence of 
such ends is in fact objectively good, as this alone would prove that the existence of life, and 
by extension human beings, truly mattered. To this end he claims as «axiomatic» and grasped 
«with intuitive certainty» that «the mere capacity to have any purposes at all [is] a good-in-
itself» and «infinitely superior to any purposelessness of being» (p. 80). Regrettably this 
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appeal to intuition does not amount to the rational grounding Jonas seeks, and nor does his 
‘negative proof’: that to deny the value of values would itself, paradoxically, betray a value-
preference.
2
 As an appeal to intuition, however, it is nevertheless persuasive: a world with 
subjective values in it does indeed strike us as infinitely superior to a world devoid of such 
value. We are inclined, therefore, to agree with Jonas that the existence of life in general and 
human beings in particular represents a good-in-itself, valuable beyond all instrumentality. 
Now, we said that a proper object of responsibility must be not only a good-in-itself, 
but also vulnerable, as only then could we be able and compelled to take responsibility for it. 
In line with his philosophy of biology, Jonas argues that all life is existentially precarious 
since dependent on the success or failure of its struggles.
3
 However, the paradigm case of a 
vulnerable good is the newborn child. The newborn’s appeal for care, and the parent’s 
perception of a duty therein, constitute the «timeless archetype of all responsibility» (p. 130) 
– one «so spontaneous that it needs no invoking of the moral law, [and] is the primordial 
human case of the coincidence of objective responsibility and the subjective feeling of the 
same» (p. 90). To perceive an infant in its state of utter vulnerability is to perceive an 
incontrovertible demand: a call of responsibility, which will remain part of our perception of 
the child «until the fulfilment of the immanent-teleological promise of eventual self-
sufficiency releases [us] from the duty» (p. 134).  
Jonas claims that responsibility for the human infant is both the most undisputed 
example of the phenomenon and also that it is qualitatively exceptional. The reason for the 
latter claim is as follows. The fact that the parent is responsible for the infant – and not only 
as it is now, but in accordance with its immanent teleology towards maturity – contains 
within it a secondary responsibility, namely, the infant’s potential for responsibility. Since 
the child’s maturity, which alone releases us from the duty of care, coincides with it 
becoming a responsible being, our responsibility is essentially oriented toward the coming-to-
be of another responsible being. According to Jonas this fact is of cosmic significance:  
                                                             
2
 Jonas’ German-language critics, most of whom work in the post-Kantian school of 
discourse ethics, have been particularly emphatic on this point. See, for instance, Apel 
(1996), Kuhlmann (1994), and Melle (1998).  
3
 For more detail on this point see Becchi and Franzini Tibaldeo (2016). 
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The appearance of [responsibility] in the world does not simply add another value to 
the already value-rich landscape of being but surpasses all that has gone before with 
something that generically transcends it. This represents a qualitative intensification 
of the valuableness of Being as a whole, the ultimate object of our responsibility. 
Thereby […] the capacity for responsibility as such […] becomes its own object in 
that having it obligates us to perpetuate its presence in the world. (1996, p. 106). 
Why, one might ask, is responsibility-for-responsibility, embodied in the parent-child 
relation, of transcendent importance? Because, Jonas notes, it represents an obligation to the 
continued existence of a moral order. Human beings alone can be good or evil, righteous or 
wretched, responsible or irresponsible – with this potential even the worst of us represents 
«the foothold for a moral universe in the physical world» (1984, p. 10). Since this entails only 
the possibility of moral goodness, the ideal of the ethical, «we are, strictly speaking, not 
responsible to the future human individuals but to the idea of Man, which is such that it 
demands the presence of its embodiment in the world» (p. 43). As such, Jonas’ theory of 
responsibility is to this extent Kantian: our moral being constitutes «the dignity of [our] 
essence» (p. 137), and it is this to which the invocation of «genuine human life» in his new 
categorical imperative refers. 
 
FEAR FOR THE VULNERABLE GOOD 
Jonas’ imperative of responsibility for humanity as a moral being first and foremost pertains 
to the ongoing existence of such beings – it does not tell us a great deal about how human life 
ought to be, except that it must have the formal capacity for morality. In previous epochs, 
perhaps, this would not have posed a problem: the human condition – which, at its most 
general, means our natality, mortality, and life self-consciously lived between these poles 
(Arendt H., 1958, p. 8) – was taken as fixed for all time. But today we face the possibility of 
substantially altering humanity through biotechnology. One might then wonder what Jonas’ 
imperative of responsibility can tell us in that context – there are, after all, few plausible 
scenarios in which our moral being as such would be endangered. To be sure, one can 
envisage the creation of a stunted form of human life biotechnologically stripped of its 
capacity to act morally; such beings might even be useful to states in certain military 
contexts. Alternatively, the biotechnological enhancement of morality – which has been 
described by some enhancement enthusiasts as an «urgent imperative» (Persson I. and 
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Savulescu J., 2008) – could easily lead to an erosion and even destruction of moral 
responsibility if the envisaged enhancement aimed at merely ensuring behaviour that 
conformed with prevalent norms (Hauskeller M., 2017). In destroying the locus of human 
dignity such an outcome would obviously fall foul of Jonas’ categorical imperative, and 
violate genuine human life even in a single instance. But the vast majority of transhumanist 
proposals do not involve anything like this – on the contrary, they typically envisage an 
enhancement of human capacities, physical, psychological, and moral. What can Jonas’ 
imperative reveal as objectionable about this prospect? 
The threats to human life that follow from biotechnology are somewhat elusive, 
requiring reflection and deliberation to identify. It is partly in this connection that Jonas 
develops what he calls the «heuristics of fear» (1984, p. 21). The purpose of the heuristic is to 
help us avert, through the spur of concern for the vulnerable good, courses of action in which 
the existence or essence of human life are threatened. It thereby appeals to a faculty of our 
psychology – fear – often overlooked by moral philosophers, but which perhaps contains a 
greater wisdom than the discipline has generally attributed to it. Leon Kass has been much 
ridiculed for suggesting that repugnance can sometimes be «the emotional expression of deep 
wisdom, beyond reason’s power fully to articulate it» (1997, p. 20). A sympathetic 
interpretation of Kass’ claim might be that such spontaneous emotional reactions 
occasionally have heuristic value in pointing us toward a wrong (Hauskeller M., 2006). We 
say «occasionally», as even in this capacity repugnance and fears can certainly be misplaced: 
in such circumstances letting them govern our actions may lead to injustices, and for this 
reason we might be dubious about the value of fear as a philosophical guide. But this 
response (itself a fear!) would be premature, as misplaced fear represents only a failure of the 
faculty to find an appropriate object. One might very well note that hope for moral progress is 
just as frequently misplaced, and yes, just as easily leads us into error. In neither case, 
however, does this amount to sufficient reason to spurn the faculty in question: what matters 
is whether the hope for a better world, or fear for a vulnerable good, is appropriate on a case-
by-case basis. 
Where humanity’s bare existence or its basic capacity for morality are threatened the 
nature of the threats are clear, and our fears well grounded: the new categorical imperative 
here aligns with our non-cognitive judgement. But in other cases where the vulnerable good 
is imperilled by biotechnology, the fear itself helps us to identify and better understand 
precisely what is at stake. As Jonas says: «we need the threat to the image of man – and 
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rather specific kinds of threat – to assure ourselves of his true image by the very recoil from 
these threats» (1984, p. 26-27). At first this might sound circular, presupposing that which is 
subsequently discovered: as though we are to imagine a threat to genuine human life, but only 
through our fearful response to that threat do we identify genuine human life. However, 
whilst Jonas admits that his argument has an air of paradox about it, it is not, in fact, circular 
in the sense just given. What Jonas means is this: the demands made of us by human dignity 
– following, we recall, from our status as moral beings – only reveal themselves when we 
perceive a violation of that dignity. It is in this sense that we discover genuine human life in 
its ‘fullness’, and hence come to «know the thing at stake only when we know that it is at 
stake» (p. 27). This is the peculiar wisdom of fear: it encourages us to see anew the good that 
might be lost.  
A little more has to be said in justification of this claim. Human dignity functions in 
this oblique way because dignity in general cannot be comprehensively described 
independently of circumstances. It is not an object separable from its context, but a status, 
denoting both the moral significance of a being and the particular ways in which one can and 
cannot treat it. While this status can be abstractly accounted for, as in Jonas’ theory of 
responsibility, the demands it makes of us can only be discovered contextually. The problem 
at hand is precisely that the context informing what dignity demands of us is rapidly 
changing. Historically, the stable temporal and spatial reach of our actions ensured that norms 
governing inter-personal relations remained sufficient. Today, of course, emerging 
technologies and novel scientific practices provide us with unprecedented ways of acting 
upon fellow human beings. In order to know what we must not do, we have to draw on 
observation, and imagination guided by fear, to discover which violate our dignity.  
In Jonas’ thought there are two different types of dignity: human dignity, which 
follows from being a moral agent – a person in Kant’s sense – and the non-personal «dignity 
of ends» (p. 8). This division reflects the history of the concept: the former corresponds to the 
notion of dignitas, and the latter to bonitas, terms which over time converged and became the 
single concept we know today as dignity. Now, according to Jonas’ philosophical biology all 
organisms are defined by immanent teleology (Coyne L., 2017). That is to say, all living 
beings have ends both in their biological constitution and their activity, and thereby possess 
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non-personal dignity. Human beings alone, of course, also possess personal, human dignity.
4
 
However, we can only come to know what either type of dignity morally entails when it is 
violated, either in reality or the imagination. A brief thought experiment will suffice to show 
how this works as a general method. If we perceive an organism which is prevented from 
living according to its immanent telos – keeping a bird caged, for example – the perception of 
the fact is given inseparably with that of its violated dignity: this bird before us is not being 
treated in the way it ought to be. Even if the bird in question does not demonstrate any 
physical or emotional discomfort – perhaps the cage is all it has ever known, meaning it does 
not long to fly – the sense of violation prevails. Indeed, in one sense the violation is greater 
still if the bird does not mind that it cannot behave and fly: we would then have established 
total domination over it.  
The violation of a being’s non-personal dignity does not, however, represent a 
categorically impermissible harm. After all, we must perpetually commit violations of this 
kind in order to live, both in the consumption of other living beings and in self-defence 
against human and non-human threats. If these acts remain wrong, which may well be the 
case, then wrongdoing is simply a tragic necessity of life (which is by no means an argument 
against non-personal dignity, or biocentric ethics more broadly). As Jonas says, following 
Albert Schweitzer, «we make ourselves guilty by insisting on being here» (2012, p. 24). The 
challenge for practical reason is to minimise such guilt by carefully distinguishing between 
the necessary and unnecessary violations of non-personal dignity. Making such judgements 
tends to be an imprecise art, as we can only do so by weighing principles against 
consequences and virtues: potentially conflicting moral registers. In the bioethical domain, 
the majority of cases are to be adjudicated in this way: we cannot often prescribe «a simple 
“yes” or “no” […]; instead, we find an area of fluid boundaries, subtle value judgments, and 
controversial decisions» (1996: 50). To alter the human condition – which is tied to our 
teleological constitution and thus our non-personal dignity – can therefore only be objected to 
for reasons of varying degrees of strength. But through the heuristic of fear we might 
                                                             
4
 Confusion can arise when «human dignity» is invoked, as it is often unclear whether the 
appeal being made is to personal dignity alone or to both personal and non-personal dignity at 
once – i.e., to the kind of dignity belonging exclusively to humans, or to the kinds of dignity 
that humans possess. For the sake of clarity we will use «human dignity» in the former sense, 
to mean the dignity possessed exclusively by humans. 
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discover compelling reasons to not biotechnologically violate it. And, as stated, courtesy of 
Jonas’ new categorical imperative and the responsibility it entails for the essence of humanity 
as a moral being, we may draw some stronger conclusions regarding human dignity. 
Wherever this sort of dignity is violated we risk genuine human life. 
 
HUMAN BEINGS AS MEANS 
The first situation, relevant to our discussion, in which Jonas argues that human dignity can 
be violated is experimental research. Transhumanism typically promises enhancement 
through either pharmacological means or those of genetic engineering. Either method, if used 
for research purposes on unwitting or unwilling human subjects, entails a categorically 
impermissible instrumentalisation of human beings: the use of our physical or mental selves 
as a source of data «must be absolutely free» (1980, p. 111). In the bioethical literature this is 
typically characterised as giving one’s informed consent to be used in research, and widely 
taken as a basic ethical requirement. But even informed consent, if left unsubstantiated, is 
insufficient (1978, p. 260-261). For example, if impoverished persons partook in medical 
research simply because they needed the financial compensation we would regard this as 
taking advantage of the vulnerable. In order to avoid such exploitation in the recruitment of 
research participants, thereby ensuring that informed consent is truly free, we require some 
robust criteria. To this end Jonas suggests that we prioritise, and progressively work down 
from, those volunteers who simultaneously a) least need remuneration, b) have the best 
understanding of the experiment and the risks involved, and c) most believe in, or identify 
with, the purpose of the research (1980, p. 123). 
Despite its almost universal acceptance, certain transhumanists have questioned the 
ethical necessity of informed consent. Rather implausibly, Steven Fuller and Veronika 
Lipinska have argued that since consent can get in the way of scientific progress then if the 
latter requires it people should be forced to take part in experiments, even those that are 
extremely risky (2014, p. 38). Why do we find this prospect so objectionable? Because in 
return for mere instrumental gains our human dignity is violated. Truly free informed consent 
is a minimum requirement not just because it implies less harm to feed into a hedonic 
calculus (although this is clearly part of its importance). It matters above all because making 
the uncoerced decision to partake in the research upholds our status as moral agents, true to 
the beings that we are. In a Kantian vernacular, we might say that by consenting in this way 
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participants remain ends while also being used as means; without doing so they are simply 
instrumentalised as a source of data. Making this very point, Jonas claims that «[o]nly 
genuine authenticity of volunteering can possibly redeem the condition of “thinghood” to 
which the subject submits» in an experimental situation (1980, p. 109). We have here, then, 
an example of how moral demands emerge from a concrete situation: in experimental 
situations human dignity is violated if we are treated as things rather than persons, revealing 
the necessity of truly free informed consent.
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The second circumstance in which the transhumanist agenda could come into conflict 
with human dignity is in the enhancement of one person (or persons) for the sake of another. 
The reason is the same as the above: individuals would thereby be treated as means for 
others’ ends. Here the possibility of eugenics – the improvement of the national stock by the 
state – rears its ugly head. To be sure, most transhumanists do not argue for a state-sponsored 
or mandated form of enhancement – a recent exception being Julian Savulescu and Ingmar 
Persson’s advocacy of compulsory moral enhancement (2008, p. 174), which they 
subsequently dropped in favour of a voluntary programme. Enhancement is most often 
envisaged as either something done to oneself or chosen by parents for their children. The 
former cannot violate human dignity, provided it is an uncoerced decision, since the free 
choice is sufficient to make instrumentalisation of oneself permissible (which does not mean, 
of course, that it is therefore wise or desirable – it may turn out to be neither). The latter case 
would, however, violate human dignity if the parents chose to enhance their future children to 
benefit themselves (or a third party) on the grounds, perhaps, that the child’s predicted 
successes would benefit or reflect well on them. In such cases the instrumentalisation of 
human beings would differ only in scale from a state-sponsored enhancement programme, 
and remain equally impermissible. 
 
THE FUTURE OF THE HUMAN CONDITION 
As the above cases involve instrumentalisation of human beings, violating our human dignity 
and thereby contravening genuine human life, Jonas’s imperative of responsibility generates 
categorical objections to them. He also, however, provided persuasive arguments against 
altering the human condition. Humans, unlike other species, have an awareness of our own 
                                                             
5
 For a critique of the foregoing arguments see Schafer (1983). 
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being – we are the being whose being is an issue for ourselves (Heidegger M., 2010) – and 
live against this shared backdrop regardless of historical or cultural circumstances: we know 
we are born rather than made, that we will one day die, and that each of our lives shares this 
givenness. Since this pertains to our organismic constitution, rather than our moral being, 
alterations made to the human condition violate only our non-personal dignity. To repeat, 
such violations are not categorically objectionable, and may be outweighed by other 
concerns. But should our worries about violations of non-personal dignity prove persuasive 
we would have reasons to abide by the human condition. To illustrate this we shall take the 
example of immortality: perhaps the most radical aspect of the transhumanist dream. 
The basic transhumanist justification for immortality is that the pleasurable 
experiences life grants us would remain qualitatively the same (or even improve if we are 
cognitively enhanced), yet increase quantitatively. At first this may appear plausible, but 
what it overlooks is the value of natality and mortality in giving structure and meaning to 
human existence, and which most clearly reveal themselves to us when we contemplate their 
abolition. We can take firstly the fact that we are born, and ask what significance our natality, 
that «perennial spring» (1984, p. 19), has for us. Jonas suspects that «if we abolish death, we 
must abolish procreation as well, for the latter is life’s answer to the former» (ibid.). This is 
not just an ecological concern, to do with the mere fact of insufficient resources and living 
space on an already overcrowded planet (1996, p. 96). Although a pertinent objection, the 
transhumanist can always invoke a utopian solution in response: that if we have mastered 
death we would surely be able to solve such logistical issues, presumably by uploading our 
minds to cyberspace. Jonas’ worry is also that the desire to procreate – beyond the sexual 
impulse – is motivated, in part, by a concern for immortality in the classical sense: to leave a 
mark on the world through one’s descendants. The realisation of transhumanist immortality 
may well diminish the desire for classical immortality through procreation, and thereby result 
in a drastic reduction of births.  
Of course, the transhumanist may see no problem with this, and argue that if human 
lives continue in perpetuity then it does not matter whether it is old or new. But Jonas 
suggests that it does matter, in terms of the constitution of society and the effects it would 
have on our collective life: «we would have a world of old age with no youth, and of known 
individuals with no surprises» (1984, p. 19). He continues: 
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[Natality] grants us the eternally renewed promise of the freshness, immediacy, and 
eagerness of youth, together with the supply of otherness as such. There is no 
substitute for this in the greater accumulation of prolonged experience: it can never 
recapture the unique privilege of seeing the world for the first time and with new 
eyes; never relive the wonder which, according to Plato, is the beginning of 
philosophy. (Ibid.) 
Conversely, were a wellspring of youth and immortal beings to exist concurrently, the result 
could be an ever-greater estrangement of the old from the young, the former stranded in a 
world they no longer understand – «walking anachronisms who have outlived themselves» 
(1996, p. 98). In both cases the loss pertains to our collective life: either a social body with no 
novelty, youth, and freshness, or else a society in which the old are increasingly alienated 
from the young. 
At the opposite end of our temporal existence is the pole of mortality: the fact that we 
must die and know that we must do so. Jonas argues that the eradication of this boundary 
could have negative effects for each individual, as knowledge of our eventual deaths plays a 
fundamental role in giving meaning and weight to our lives (1984, p. 19). The reason is that 
our finitude is a presupposition to our making meaningful decisions – and, as the 
existentialists taught us, our choices inform who we are. Of course, the scope of choice is 
delimited by factors beyond our control, but to the extent that our lives are undetermined we 
have before us a range of possibilities: if we are very lucky we can choose where to live, 
which job to take, whether to have children, and so on. On a more everyday level we can 
make choices ranging from how we treat others to which hobbies to pursue. We might choose 
to spend our time learning to play the piano rather than travelling, seeing our families, or 
helping in the community. The fact that this choice is delimited by the duration of our 
lifespan is precisely what gives the decision weight, as we must choose to allocate the 
cherished time we have in one way and not the others. An immortal, however, could 
eventually do anything and everything, and rather than this being liberating, as the 
transhumanists naïvely suppose, it could in fact sap actions of their meaning: if one cannot 
die, an infinity of options are open to us and thus no longer have the weight we presently 
experience in them as choices. In other words, the quantitative gain could come at a 
qualitative cost, the abolition of mortality amounting to a form of existential denigration. As 
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Jonas notes, paraphrasing Psalm 90, «[p]erhaps a nonnegotiable limit to our expected time is 
necessary for each of us as the incentive to number our days and make them count» (ibid.).
6
 
The foregoing reflections on the value of the human condition only refer to our 
lifespan – they do not encompass the other physical or psychological aspects of our 
organismic being that transhumanists hope to enhance (for an example of complementary 
arguments pertaining to these dimensions see Skidelsky E., 2018). Nevertheless, it 
demonstrates how Jonas’ heuristic of fear can be put to work and what it accomplishes. Our 
natality and mortality, the former so often overlooked and the latter so frequently derided 
throughout history, in fact reveal themselves to be of great significance for the quality of our 
lives. With this observation we return to our guiding theme.  
 
GENUINE HUMAN LIFE 
We stressed earlier on that those biotechnological enhancements which violated our human 
dignity threatened what Jonas called the idea of Man, or, in his categorical imperative, 
«genuine human life». By contrast, those enhancements that violated only our non-personal 
dignity could not threaten the genuine human life invoked. Why? Because only the former 
violations pertain to our moral being, whereas the latter pertain to our organismic being, 
underpinning what we have called the human condition. The result is a conception of genuine 
human life that is strangely narrow, all the more so since across Jonas’ bioethical writings he 
raised a variety of pertinent objections to genetic engineering as a means and human 
enhancement as an end. To take one such example, not yet discussed, Jonas argues that our 
existential and political freedoms would likely be undermined by genetic engineering (1980, 
p. 161-165), which could even hold, in some circumstances, if this were a self-chosen 
enhancement (Coyne L., 2018). Nevertheless this would only be a violation of non-personal 
dignity rather than a categorically impermissible violation of human dignity, and the same is 
                                                             
6
 Jonas always hoped that his philosophical thought would stand on its own two feet, 
independently of any religious arguments, which he confined to his theological writings. At 
times, however – as the reference to Psalm 90 indicates – he drew on theological notions for 
rhetorical purposes, most notably, perhaps, when employing the imago Dei as a synonym for 
the idea of Man (1984, p. 140). For a criticism of this feature of Jonas’ thought see Hottois 
(1993, p. 14).  
17 
 
true of the arguments against immortality provided above. As such, we are denied the fuller 
account of genuine human life which Jonas’ thought seemed to provide us with. 
Therefore a division between two concepts, used synonymously in Jonas’ ethical 
theory, might be in order. On the one side we can place the ‘idea of Man’, and on the other 
‘genuine human life’. The rationale for doing so is as follows. The idea of Man follows from 
our moral being: it is the ever-present possibility for goodness that each human being, as a 
moral agent, represents. This is the quality which Jonas’ imperative claims we are 
categorically obligated to preserve, and also forms the grounds of our human dignity. But this 
is not all that is worth protecting in human life, as the heuristic of fear reveals. The human 
condition – rooted in our organismic being and thereby connected to our non-personal dignity 
– also reveals its value when we consider its abolition or transformation. Taken together, 
then, the idea of Man and the human condition might be said to constitute a genuine human 
life. This phrase would have to be detached from Jonas’ imperative, of course, and replaced 
with the idea of Man, since non-personal dignity can make no claims to categorical 
preservation. But what this move allows us to do is provide a richer account of genuine 
human life, one that comprises the moral and organismic aspects of our being, and although 
the former is of greater worth, the latter still has a profound significance for us. To alter our 
status as beings that are born rather than made, and live in the knowledge of our shared 
finitude, would come at a price arguably not worth paying.  
In this way Jonas’ thought can be construed as an alternative, or perhaps 
accompaniment, to Kass and Fukuyama’s comparable arguments. It would unite Fukuyama’s 
concern that transhumanism threatens our human dignity (which he had referred to as ‘Factor 
X’) and Kass’ worry that it might threaten something valuable associated with what is 
natural. In Jonas’ vocabulary this is to say that transhumanism imperils, in some 
circumstances, the idea of Man as a moral being, while in other circumstances it threatens the 
value of the human condition. Where it does so, revealing to us the significance of both, we 
can determine what constitutes a genuine human life. 
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